Authentication protocols are designed to work correctly in the presence of an adversary that can prompt honest principals to engage in an unbounded number of concurrent instances of the protocol. The amount of local state maintained by a single instance of a typical authentication protocol is bounded. This suggests that there is a bound on the resources needed to attack the protocol. Such bounds clarify the nature of attacks on and provide a rigorous basis for automated veri cation of authentication protocols. Few such bounds are known. This paper establishes an upper bound on the number of protocol instances needed to attack a large class of protocols, which c o n tains versions of some well-known authentication protocols, including the Yahalom, Otway-Rees, and Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocols.
Introduction
Many protocols are designed to work correctly in the presence of an adversary also called a penetrator that can prompt honest principals to engage in an unbounded number of concurrent instances of the protocol. This includes some protocols for authentication, Byzantine Agreement GLR95 , secure reliable multicast Rei96, MR97 , and electronic payment OPT97 . In this paper, we foc u s o n a u t h e n tication, including key establishment DvOW92, MvOV97 . Authentication protocols should satisfy at least two kinds of correctness requirements: secrecy, which states that certain values are not obtained by the adversary, a n d agreement, which states that a principal's conclusion about the identity of a principal with whom it is communicating is never incorrect.
A single instance of an authentication protocol maintains a bounded amount of local state. This suggests that there is a bound on the resources needed to attack the protocol. Such bounds can provide insight i n to the behavior of these protocols and the possible kinds of attacks on them. They can also provide a rigorous basis for automated veri cation using state-space exploration. Authentication protocols are short and look deceptively simple, but numerous awed or weak protocols have been published; some examples are described in DS81, BAN90, WL94, AN95, AN96, Low96, Aba97, LR97, THG98b . This attests to the importance of rigorous veri cation.
The author gratefully acknowledges the support of NSF under Grant CCR-9876058 and the support of ONR under Grant N00014-99-1-0358 Email: stoller@cs.indiana.edu Web: http: www.cs.indiana.edu ~stoller Allowing an unbounded number of concurrent protocol instances makes the numberofreachable states unbounded, so state-space exploration is not directly applicable. The case studies in MCF87, Ros95, HTWW96, DK97, LR97, MMS97, MCJ97, MSS98, Bol98, DNL99 show that state-space exploration of authentication protocols and similar cryptographic protocols is feasible when small upper bounds are imposed on the size of messages and the number of protocol instances. However, in most of those case studies, the bounds were not rigorously justi ed, so the results do not prove correctness of the protocols. Reduction theorems are needed, which show that if a protocol is correct in a system with certain nite bounds on these parameters, then the protocol is correct in the unbounded system as well.
This paper presents a reduction for a large class of protocols expressible in the strand space model THG98b, THG98a, THG98c . 1 In this model, a regular strand can be regarded as a thread that runs the program corresponding to one role e.g., initiator or responder of the protocol and then terminates; thus, a regular strand corresponds to one instance of one role in the protocol. Our reduction imposes two signi cant restrictions on protocols. First, the shallow ciphertext restriction states that the protocol does not use nested ciphertexts.
2 This is easily checked by static analysis of the program, so we call it a static restriction. Second, the strand count restriction states that in every history i.e., every possible behavior of the system, each regular strand depends on at most a given number of other regular strands. This is not easily checked by static analysis, so we call it a dynamic restriction. We introduce a dynamic restriction because, with static restrictions alone, it seems di cult to nd restrictions that are both strong enough to justify a reduction and weak enough to be satis ed by w ell-known protocols. Intuitively, correct authentication protocols generally satisfy the strand count restriction, because they are designed to involve only a small number of participants.
In general, dynamic restrictions are not automatically checkable. We solve this problem by proving reductions for the strand count restriction as well as the correctness requirements. In other words, we prove: if a protocol satis es the strand count restriction and the correctness requirements when appropriate bounds are imposed on the number of regular strands in a history, then the protocol also satis es the strand count restriction and correctness requirements without those bounds. We prove the contrapositive of this statement, by supposing that some history of the unbounded system violates the strand count restriction or a correctness requirement and constructing a history violating the same property and containing at most the appropriate number of regular strands. That history is constructed by starting from an earliest node in the strand space model, events are usually called nodes" that causes a violation of the property and nding the set of nodes on which that node depends. Roughly speaking, that set of nodes, augmented with This restriction is not essential, but it simpli es the proof. appropriate actions by the adversary, is the desired history.
Our notion of dependence between nodes is a variant of Lamport's happened-before relation Lam78 . It ignores some dependencies that are not useful in attacks; speci cally, it ignores dependencies induced by the adversary unnecessarily re-using temporary values nonces or session keys, when a fresh value would have served just as well. Without this re ned notion of dependence, few interesting protocols would satisfy the strand count requirement. In the construction described in the previous paragraph, a substitution of fresh temporary values for unnecessarily re-used temporary values is used to eliminate these useless dependencies. Dynamic restrictions and this specialized notion of dependence are the key technical ideas underlying our reduction.
Few reductions applicable to authentication protocols are known. Most existing techniques for automated analysis of systems with unbounded numbers of processes, such as CGJ95, KM95, EN96, AJ98 , are not applicable to authentication protocols, because they assume the set of values equivalently, the set of local states of each process is independent of the numberof processes, whereas authentication protocols generate fresh nonces and session keys, so the set of values grows as the number of processes equivalently, t h e n umber of regular strands increases. Dolev and Yao's algorithms for verifying secrecy requirements of cryptographic protocols are interesting but limited DY83 ; they do not handle agreement requirements or known-key attacks MvOV97, p. 496 , and they apply to a severely restricted class of protocols, which excludes almost all well-known authentication protocols e.g., the Otway-Rees OR87 and Yahalom BAN90 protocols and is strictly included in the class of protocols handled by our reduction.
Roscoe and Broadfoot use data-independence techniques to prove an upper bound on the number of nonces needed for an attack Ros98, RB99 . That result assumes that each principal participates in at most one protocol instance at a time. Our reduction does not require that assumption.
Lowe p r o ved a reduction for a corrected version of the Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol, hereafter called the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol Low96 . Lowe subsequently generalized that work to apply to a class of protocols Low98a, Low98b . Lowe's result does not handle agreement requirements Low98a, p. 61 or known-key attacks and does not apply to protocols that use temporary secrets, such as the unilateral protocol U de ned in 2. Lowe's result does not apply to the Otway-Rees and Yahalom protocols.
The reduction embodied in Theorems 1 and 2 handles secrecy and agreement requirements, allows known-key attacks, applies to some protocols such as U that use temporary secrets, and applies to some well-known protocols, including the Yahalom, Otway-Rees, and NeedhamSchroeder-Lowe protocols, after those protocols have been modi ed slightly to eliminate forwarding of ciphertexts. Our reduction provides an upper bound on the numberof regular strands needed for an attack. From this bound and the shallow ciphertext restriction, it is easy to obtain upper bounds on the number of nonces and the number of penetrator strands needed for an attack.
Directions for future work include broadening the scope of our results by considering hash functions, timestamps, and recency requirements, improving our results by obtaining smaller bounds, and extending our approach to handle other problems, such as secure reliable multicast and electronic payment.
Model of Authentication Protocols
We adopt the strand space model THG98b , with a few minor modi cations. We i n troduce simple languages for expressing authentication protocols and their correctness requirements.
The set of primitive terms is the union of:
1. All primitive terms are terms. A set S of nodes is backwards-closed with respect to a binary relation R on nodes i , for all nodes n 1 and n 2 , i f n 2 2 S and n 1 R n 2 , then n 1 2 S. 4 We use the standard notion of subterm, rather than the modi ed subterm relation v de ned in THG98b , in which k is not necessarily a subterm of ftg k . Our de nition induces a stronger notion of uniquely-originates that better captures the standard notion of freshness.
A bundle C in a strand space tr is a subset of N tr such t h a t 1. If n 1 2 C and termn 1 is negative, then there exists a unique n 2 2 C such that n 2 msg ! n 1 .
2. C is acyclic, where C is the re exive and transitive c l o s u r e o f msg ! lcl ! C C. Note that C is a partial order THG98b , originally de ned by Lamport, who called it happenedbefore Lam78 .
3. C is well-founded, i.e., d o e s n o t h a ve in nite descending chains. A history is a strand space tr such that N tr is a bundle. We sometimes regard a history tr as the bundle N tr .
The set of predecessors of a node n in a history tr is preds tr n = fn 0 2 N tr j n 0 tr n^n 0 6 = ng:
1 Note that preds tr n can be regarded as a history tr 0 in a natural way, with N tr 0 = preds tr n a n d for all n in N tr 0 , term tr 0 n = t e r m tr n.
Roles, Protocols, and Penetrator
A role is a parameterized sequence of signed terms. Associated with each parameter is a type, i.e., a set of allowed values. Some parameters may be designated as uniquely-originated; informally, this means that the value of that parameter must be uniquely-originated. Also, for each parameter, a subset of its possible values may bedesignated as compromised; for an instantiated role, if any argument is a compromised value of the corresponding parameter the correctness requirements for that instance of the role are weaker, as described below. In examples, uniquely-originated parameters are underlined in the parameter list. The well-formedness requirements on roles are:
1. 4. For each role r, for each parameter x of r of type Key sess or Nonce, the rst occurrence of x in r is in a positive term i x is uniquely-originated. In other words, for each role, for each parameter bound to a genval, that genval is sent beforeit is received i that genval is uniquely-originated in that role.
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Thayer et al. require that bundles be nite THG98b . We require well-foundedness instead.
A protocol is a set of roles. For example, the roles in a simple unilateral authentication protocol U that uses a temporary secret are:
Initi : Name; r : Name; n : Nonce = hh+ifnrg keyi;r ; ,nii Respi : Name; r : Name; n : Nonce = hh,ifnrg keyi;r ; +nii 2 Parameters i and r hold the names of the initiator and responder, respectively. Parameter n of Init is uniquely-originated. In examples, we assume there is a single compromised principal, named P, so the set of compromised values for parameters i and r is fPg. Parameter n has no compromised values.
The rst well-formedness requirement is violated by roles that receive and forward ciphertexts without decrypting them occurrences of encr in negative terms represent decryptions. In most protocols, the forwarding role does not encrypt the forwarded ciphertext, so modifying the protocol to eliminate such forwarding has no impact on the correctness of the protocol, so for our purposes, it su ces to analyze protocols modi ed in this way. For example, the forwarding of ciphertexts in the Yahalom protocol is easily removed without a ecting the correctness of the protocol, and the modi ed protocol satis es our well-formedness requirements. The resulting protocol Y is Initi : Name; r : Name; n i : Nonce; n r : Nonce; k : Key sess = hh+ini; ,frkninrg keyi;S ; +fnrg k ; +sh 1 knrii Respi : Name; r : Name; n i : Nonce; n r : Nonce 
Correctness Requirements
Following WL93 , we consider the following correctness requirements.
Genval Secrecy. Informally, g e n val secrecy says: the penetrator learns a genval g that uniquely originates on an uncompromised regular strand only if the protocol deliberately reveals g.
Protocols may deliberately reveal such terms to model known-key attacks. By convention, a protocol deliberately reveals g if the protocol sends either g itself or both shares of g unencrypted. Thus, a protocol satis es genval secrecy i , for every history tr for , for every genval g that uniquely originates on an uncompromised regular strand, if tr contains a penetrator strand containing a node n with termn = + g, then either there is a regular node n such that termn is positive and contains g unencrypted, or there are regular nodes n 1 and n 2 such that there exists a term t containing g unencrypted and such t h a t f o r i 2 f 1; 2g, termn i i s p o s i t i v e and contains sh i t unencrypted.
Long-Term Secrecy. Informally, long-term secrecy says: the penetrator does not learn longterm keys. A protocol satis es long-term secrecy i , for every history tr for , for every k 2 Key sym Key asym nKey P , tr does not contain a penetrator node n with termn = + k.
Agreement. Informally, agreement says: if a certain role executes to a certain point with certain arguments in an uncompromised regular strand, then a certain other role must have executed to a certain point with certain arguments. An agreement requirement for a protocol has the form hr 1 ; len 1 ; params 1 i precedes hr 2 ; len 2 ; params 2 i, where params 1 and params 2 are sequences of parameters of r 1 and r 2 , respectively. satis es that agreement requirement i , for every history tr for , if tr contains an uncompromised strand s 2 for role r 2 such that jtrs 2 j len 2 , t h e n tr contains a strand s 1 for role r 1 such that jtrs 1 j len 1 and such that the sequence of arguments of s 2 corresponding to parameters params 2 equals the sequence of arguments of s 1 corresponding to parameters params 1 .
For example, the simple unilateral authentication protocol 2 is expected to satisfy genval secrecy, long-term secrecy, and the agreement requirement: hResp; 2; hhi; r; n iii precedes hInit; 2; hhi; r; n iii.
The Yahalom protocol 3 might be expected to satisfy genval secrecy, long-term secrecy, and the agreement requirements hResp; 2; hhi; r; ni; nriii precedes hInit; 2; hhi; r; n i ; n r iii hInit; 3; hhi; r; n i ; n r ; k iii precedes hResp; 3; hhi; r; ni; nr; k iii:
Static and Dynamic Restrictions
Informally, a set S 0 of nodes of a history tr supports a set S of nodes of tr if S 0 contains all of the regular nodes in S and all of the regular nodes on which regular nodes in S depend. The strand count restriction imposes an upper bound on the size of a minimum-size support" for nodess for all regular strands s. As shown in Section 3.2, for some correct and interesting protocols, the set of nodes on a strand may need an arbitrarily large support. Thus, those protocols would not satisfy the strand count restriction, if it were de ned in terms of support. This motivates the introduction in Section 3.2 of a more re ned notion, called irreplaceable support, which ignores dependencies induced by the adversary unnecessarily re-using a genval, when a fresh genval would have served just as well. Section 3.3 de nes the strand count restriction in terms of irreplaceable support.
Hereafter, we generally consider only protocols satisfying the following static restrictions:
Shallow Ciphertext Restriction: The encryption height o f e v ery term in eve r y r o l e i s a t m o s t 1. Our type restrictions imply that arguments of roles are never ciphertexts, so the encryption height of arguments is zero.
Unsent Long-Term Keys Restriction: Regular strands do not send long-term keys in messages;
formally, in every term in every role, the operators key, pubkey, and pvtkey appear only in the second argument o f t h e encr operator.
If a protocol of interest does not satisfy the shallow ciphertext restriction, applying a transformation that removes some encryptions while preserving correctness might help HL99 . The type restrictions and the shallow ciphertext restriction together imply that for every regular node n, the encryption height of termn is at most 1. It is easy to show that every protocol satisfying the unsent long-term keys restriction satis es long-term secrecy.
Support
Informally, a set S 0 of nodes of a history tr supports a set S of nodes of tr if S 0 contains all of the regular nodes in S and if S 0 can be transformed into a history merely by adding penetrator strands i.e., without adding or changing regular strands. In other words, S 0 supports S if there exists a history tr 0 such t h a t N tr 0 contains all of the regular nodes in S and such that all nodes in N tr 0 n S are penetrator nodes. Equivalently, S 0 is a set of nodes that contains all of the regular nodes in S and such that, by intercepting all terms sent by regular nodes in S 0 , the penetrator is able to produce all terms received by regular nodes in S. Our formal de nition of support is based on this last characterization.
A term t is derivable by the penetrator from a set S of terms, denoted derivS; t, if there exists a history tr such that 1. tr contains a penetrator node with term +t.
2. For each regular node n in tr, termn i s i n S.
deriv is implicitly parameterized by t h e s e t Key P of keys initially known to the penetrator. Similar notions of derivability h a ve been considered by s e v eral researchers and can be computed using the approach of Clarke et al. CJM98 .
A s e t S 0 of nodes supports a s e t S of nodes in a history tr if 1. S 0 contains all regular nodes in S.
2. S 0 is backwards-closed with respect to lcl !.
3. For all negative regular nodes n in S 0 , derivtermpreds tr n S 0 ; termn.
If S 0 supports S, w e call S 0 a support for S. For example, consider a history tr of the Yahalom protocol 3 containing an initiator strand s I , a responder strand s R , a n d a s e r v er strand s S , all of maximal length, and containing no penetrator strands. Then fhs I ; 1i; hs R ; 1i; hs R ; 2i; hs S ; 1i; hs S ; 2ig supports fhs I ; 2ig.
The following lemma formalizes the rst sentence of Section 3.1. Lemma 1. Let tr be a history of a protocol satisfying the shallow ciphertext and unsent longterm keys restrictions. Let S N tr . If S 0 supports S, then there exists a history tr 0 of such that 1. For each regular strand s of tr, i f S 0 contains k 0 nodes on strand s, a n d trs is a pre x of role r with arguments args, then jtr 0 sj k and tr 0 s is a pre x of role r with arguments args.
2. Every strand in domtr 0 n domtr is a penetrator strand.
Proof: Straightforward.
Replaceable Genvals; Irreplaceable Support
For some correct and interesting protocols, the set of nodes on a strand may need an arbitrarily large support. For example, consider the Yahalom protocol 3. Suppose strands s I ; 1 , s R;1 , a n d s S;1 are initiator, responder, and server strands, respectively, that interact without interference from the penetrator. The nonce g R;1 that originates on s R;1 is revealed to the penetrator by the last node of s I ; 1 and the last node of s R;1 . The penetrator then behaves as the initiator, interacting with a responder strand s R;2 and a server strand s S;2 , except that the penetrator uses g R;1 instead of a fresh nonce. When they nish, a nonce g I ; 2 that originates on s I ; 2 is revealed. The penetrator then behaves as the responder, interacting with strands s I ; 3 and s S;3 , except that the penetrator uses g I ; 2 instead of a fresh nonce. This pattern continues, with the penetrator alternating between the initiator and responder roles and re-using nonces, thereby creating arbitrarily long chains of dependencies. Consequently, the smallest set that supports a strand in the i'th iteration of this pattern has size linear in i.
The strand count restriction imposes an upper bound on the size of a minimum-sized support" for each regular strand. Thus, if the strand count restriction were de ned in terms of the above notion of support, some interesting protocols, such as the Yahalom protocol, would not satisfy it. To solve this problem, we introduce a notion called irreplaceable support". Informally, for a set S of nodes, if regular nodes in S receive a genval g only in contexts in which the penetrator can substitute a di erent v alue of the appropriate type, then g is said to be replaceable" in S, and the dependence of S on the regular nodes that reveal g to the penetrator is ignored.
A g e n val g is replaceable in a set S of nodes of a history tr if
1. g appears in the term of some node in S.
2. g is the value of a uniquely-originated parameter of a regular strand s in tr.
3. S does not contain the node on strand s at which g originates.
Let replaceable tr S denote the set of genvals that are replaceable in S in tr. We elide the subscript when the history is evident f r o m t h e c o n text.
A substitution is a partial function from genvals to genvals. Let t denote the term obtained by applying a substitution to a term t, i.e., by replacing all occurrences of each genval g in dom w i t h g. We o verload substitutions to apply to sets of terms in the obvious way: S = S t2S ft g. A s e t S 0 of nodes irreplaceably supports a s e t S of nodes in a history tr if 1. S 0 contains all regular nodes in S.
3. For all negative regular nodes n in S 0 , derivtermpreds tr n S 0 ; termn , where maps all replaceable genvals in S 0 to some fresh genval g 0 , i.e., dom = replaceable tr S 0 and g 0 does not appear in S 0 .
Note that replaceable tr S 0 replaceable tr S. It is crucial that dom = replaceable tr S 0 in item 3; taking dom = replaceable tr S instead would be inadequate for establishing Lemma 2. For a strand s, i f S 0 irreplaceably supports nodess, then we s a y t h a t S 0 irreplaceably supports s.
We h a ve the following analogue of Lemma 1.
Lemma 2. Let tr be a history of a protocol satisfying the shallow ciphertext and unsent longterm keys restrictions. Let S N tr . Suppose S 0 supports S. Let bea substitution that maps each replaceable genval in S 0 to a distinct fresh genval, i.e., dom = replaceableS 0 , and for all genvals g 1 and g 2 in dom , g 1 does not appear in termS 0 , and if g 1 6 = g 2 , t h e n g 1 6 = g 2 .
There exists a history tr 0 of such that 1. For each regular strand s, if S 0 contains k 0 nodes on strand s, and trs is a pre x of role r with arguments args, then jtrs 0 j k and tr 0 s is a pre x of role r with arguments args .
Proof: Let g 0 beagenval in the range of . For each g e n val g, an occurrence of g in a regular node must come from instantiating a parameter whose value is g; this follows from the rst and second well-formedness requirements for protocols. Thus, changing the values of all parameters bound to g has exactly the e ect of changing all occurrences of g in regular nodes.
Freshness of g 0 ensures that g 0 does not originate on a regular strand in tr and hence that, for genvals g that are arguments of uniquely-originated parameters and are not replaceable in S 0 , including Message strands of the form Mg 0 in tr 0 does not violate the requirement that g be uniquely-originated. g 0 might not be uniquely-originated in tr 0 . This also does not violate the second item in the de nition of history for ; we prove this by contradiction. A violation would occur if there is a regular strand s for a role r with a uniquely-originated parameter p that is bound in s to some replaceable genval g in tr and to g 0 in tr 0 , and if jtr 0 sj i, where i is index of the rst term in r that contains p. In that case, S 0 contains hs; ii, which is the node from which g originates in tr, so the third item in the de nition of replaceable implies that g is not replaceable in S 0 , a c o n tradiction.
The main proof obligation is to show that, for each negative regular node n in S 0 such that termn contains some replaceable genval g, termn is derivable from predsn S 0 . This follows directly from the de nition of irreplaceable support.
Substituting fresh genvals for replaceable genvals in a history does not a ect minimum-size irreplaceable supports. This observation is captured in the following lemma, which is used in the proof of Theorem 1 in Section 5.
Lemma 3. Let tr be a history of a protocol satisfying the shallow ciphertext and unsent longterm keys restrictions. Let S be a set of regular nodes in tr. Let 0 be a substitution that replaces replaceable genvals with fresh genvals, i.e., dom 0 = replaceableS and for every g in dom , g does not appear in tr. Let tr 0 betr with 0 applied to all terms of regular nodes and with necessary penetrator strands added. If a set S 0 of regular nodes is a minimum-size irreplaceable support of S in tr 0 , t h e n S 0 is a minimum-size irreplaceable support of S in tr.
Proof: All of the replaceable genvals of S are replaced by the substitution in item 3 of the de nition of irreplaceable support, so the particular genvals in replaceableS are irrelevant. What matters is where those genvals appear in the history i.e., in which nodes, and in which positions in the terms of those nodes. Applying 0 does not a ect that.
It is not di cult to devise an algorithm that computes a minimum-size irreplaceable support of a given set of nodes in a given history. Roughly, the algorithm is as follows. Start with S 0 equal to S. Repeat the following step until a xed-point is reached: for each regular node n in S 0 , add to S 0 all nodes on strandn that precede n, and if n is a negative node and termn contains a ciphertext c created with an encryption key not known to the penetrator, then add to S a positive regular node n 0 such that termn 0 c o n tains c. Revisiting the example from the beginning of Section 3.2, a strand in the i'th iteration has an irreplaceable support of constant s i z e i.e., independent o f i, because the genvals that originate in one iteration are replaceable in strands of the next iteration.
There are protocols that have histories that contain strands s such that the smallest set that irreplaceably supports s is arbitrarily large. Such protocols seem to be useless or ine cient, so there is little motivation for more complicated notions of support that avoid this. An example of such a protocol is the protocol containing only the role R n : Nonce; n 0 : Nonce = hh+fng keyA;B ; ,fn 0 g keyA;B ii. Let trs 0 = R n 0 ; n 0 and for i 0, let trs i = R n i ; n i,1 , where each n i is an element of Nonce. tr is a history of . The smallest set that irreplaceably supports s i in tr contains i nodes.
Strand Count Restriction
A strand count for a protocol is a function from the set of roles of to the natural numbers. A set S of nodes has strand count f i , for each r o l e r, S contains nodes from fr strands for r.
A history tr satis es the strand count restriction for strand count f, abbreviated SCRf, i for each regular strand s in tr, there exists a set of nodes with strand count at most f that irreplaceably supports s. A protocol satis es SCRf i all of its histories do.
The following table lists some protocols and, for each protocol , a strand count for which satis es SCRf. Forwarding of ciphertexts has been eliminated from the protocols, as described in Section 2.1. The fact that f OR Srvr 1 is closely related to the fact that the Otway-Rees protocol does not ensure key agreement THG98a . Thus, all of these protocols, and perhaps many other interesting authentication protocols, satisfy SCRf 2 , where f 2 r = 2 for every role r.
Protocol
Strand
Theorem 1 in Section 5 implies that one can check whether a protocol satis es SCRf by state-space exploration of histories with a bounded number of strands; for example, for the Yahalom protocol 3, our reduction requires that histories with up to 28 regular strands 7 each o f I n i t a n d Srvr, and 14 of Resp beexplored. For most protocols, this is computationally infeasible, so the results in 5 were proved manually. Future work will aim to obtain tighter bounds that make this check computationally feasible.
Dependence Width
Informally, the dependence width of a negative term t in a role of protocol is the maximum number of positive regular nodes needed in any history tr of to provide the penetrator with enough knowledge to produce the term received by any node in tr that is an instance of t. The concept of dependence width is used in the proof of Theorem 1 to bound the numberof strands involved in a violation of the strand count restriction.
A revealing set for a negative node n in a history tr is a set S of positive regular nodes in tr such that 8n 0 2 S : n 0 tr n a n d derivtermS; termn. An instance of the ith term in a role r is a node of the form hs; ii, where s is a strand for r. Let t bea negative term in a role of a protocol . The dependence width of t in is the maximum, over all histories tr of and over all instances hs; ii of t in tr, of jR n nodes tr sj, where R is a minimum-size revealing set for n in tr.
The dependence width of a protocol is the maximum dependence width of the terms in the roles of .
Nodes in R that are on the same strand as the instance of t are not counted in the dependence width because, in the proof of Theorem 1|speci cally, in equation 7|those nodes appear in irrSupp tr 0 s 0 and hence are excluded from the domain of the rightmost union, and the dependence width is designed to bound the size of the domain of that union.
The proof of Theorem 1 relies on an upper bound on the dependence width of the protocol. It is convenient to obtain this bound based on the syntactic structure of the protocol. In general, this is di cult. For example, if the protocol might send terms of the forms fgg k 1 , fk 1 g k 2 , fk 2 g k 3 , : : : , fk i,1 g k i , k i , then i + 1 terms are needed to reveal g to the penetrator. We avoid this problem by exploiting the fact that we are interested in protocols satisfying genval secrecy, which prohibits this kind of behavior.
GS dependence width is de ned in the same way as dependence width, except that the maximum over histories is restricted to histories satisfying genval secrecy. The following lemma provides a bound on the GS dependence width of a protocol.
Lemma 4. Let bea protocol satisfying the shallow ciphertext and unsent long-term keys restrictions. Let t be a negative t e r m i n a r o l e r of . The GS dependence width of t in is at most 2N g + N c , where N g is the numberof parameters of type Key sess or Nonce that appear in t and that do not appear unencrypted in terms that precede t in r, a n d N c is the number of occurrences of encr in t.
Proof: genval secrecy implies that at most two regular nodes are needed to reveal each g e n val. The unsent long-term keys restriction implies that no long-term keys are revealed. The de nition of the Message role implies that all texts are initially known to the penetrator. The shallow ciphertext restriction implies that at most one node is needed to reveal a ciphertext, namely, the node that sends that ciphertext without this restriction, a ciphertext could be sent encrypted, and a chain of messages might be needed to reveal it. Pairs do not require special consideration, because a pair is known exactly when both of its components are known. The rst well-formedness requirement for protocols implies that the numberofciphertexts in an instantiation of a parameterized term t is at most the number of encryption operators in t.
Parameters of type Key sess or Nonce that appear unencrypted in terms that precede t in r are not counted because the genval bound to such a parameter is revealed by a node n on the same strand as the instance of t, s o n is not counted in the dependence width.
Here is a simple re nement of the above lemma.
Lemma 5. Let bea protocol satisfying the shallow ciphertext and unsent long-term keys restrictions. Suppose terms in the roles of do not contain the operators sh 1 or sh 2 . Let t bea negative term in a role r of . The GS dependence width of t in is at most N g + N c , where N g is the number of parameters of type Key sess or Nonce that appear in t and that do not appear unencrypted in any p o s i t i v e terms that precede t in r, a n d N c is the number of occurrences of encr in t.
Proof: For such protocols, genval secrecy implies that at most one node is needed to reveal each genval. The rest of the proof is the same as for Lemma 4.
Let DW GS x denote the GS dependence width of a term or protocol. For the simple unilateral protocol 2, Lemma 5 implies DW GS U 2. For the Yahalom protocol 3, Lemma 4 implies that the term with the largest GS dependence width is the third term in Resp, which has N g = 2 and N c = 2 , so DW GS Y 6. Parameter ni is not counted in N g for the second term in Init, because ni appears unencrypted in the rst term of Init.
Lemmas 4 and 5 pessimistically assume that the penetrator needs to learn all of the genvals in an instance of t in order to produce that term, but if the penetrator is merely forwarding a ciphertext produced by a regular node, the penetrator does not need to know the genvals in that ciphertext. A s l i g h tly more complicated analysis, similar to that in Sto99 , takes this into account and often provides a tighter upper bound on the GS dependence width. The GS dependence width of a protocol can sometimes be decreased by applying the following transformation: in each role, replace each negative term of the form ,t 1 t 2 with the sequence of negative terms ,t 1 ; ,t 2 . For example, applying this transformation to the Yahalom protocol 3 splits the third term in Resp, reducing the GS dependence width of the protocol from 6 to 5. This transformation preserves all correctness requirements, provided the lengths in agreement requirements are adjusted appropriately. However, it can introduce violations of the strand count requirement.
Thus, if the transformed protocol violates SCRf f o r a g i v en f, then the untransformed protocol should be considered instead, or a larger strand count should be considered. Proof: The forward direction of the i " is easy. For the reverse direction , we prove the contrapositive, i.e., we suppose there exists a history tr of violating SCRf or genval secrecy, and we construct a history of with strand count at most f; that violates the same property. SCRf a n d genval secrecy are safety properties AS85 satis ed by histories with zero nodes, and tr is well-founded, so there exists a minimal with respect to tr n o d e n 0 such that 1. preds tr n 0 regarded as a history satis es SCRf and genval secrecy.
Reduction for Strand Count Restriction and Genval Secrecy
2. preds tr n 0 f n 0 g violates SCRf o r g e n val secrecy. Let tr 0 be preds tr n 0 , regarded as a history. Let s 0 = strandn 0 a n d i 0 = indexn 0 .
tr 0 satis es SCRf, so there exists an irreplaceable support S 0 for s 0 in tr 0 with strand count at most f. Note that in tr 0 , s 0 does not include n 0 ; in fact, jtr 0 s 0 j = i 0 , 1. For a strand s, let irrSupp tr s denote a minimum-size irreplaceable support for s in tr. Consider two cases, depending on whether n 0 is positive or negative.
case: n 0 is a negative n o d e . It cannot cause a violation of genval secrecy, so it must cause a violation of SCRf. n 0 directly depends on hs 0 ; i 0 ,1i and on a revealing set R for termn 0 . case: n 0 is a positive node. It cannot cause a violation of SCRf, so it must cause a violation of genval secrecy. n 0 directly depends only on hs 0 ; i 0 , 1i, s o w e d e n e S 1 by 7 with R = ;. S 1 has strand count a t m o s t f;. case: n 0 causes a violation of genval secrecy in tr. n 0 must be a positive node that reveals to the penetrator a genval g not previously known to the penetrator, i.e., derivterm tr 1 N tr 1 n fn 0 g; g is false. It is easy to see that removing nodes in N tr n N tr 1 does not destroy this violation of genval secrecy. We s h o w that g is not replaceable in S 1 ; then it is easy to conclude that n 0 causes a violation of genval secrecy in tr 1 . Note that S 1 irreplaceably supports itself in tr and in tr 1 . Consider two cases, depending on whether g appears in a negative regular node in S 1 .
case: g does not appear in a negative regular node in S 1 . g appears in termn 0 , so g appears in a positive but not a negative node in s 0 , so the fourth well-formedness requirement for protocols implies that g uniquely originates on s 0 . S 1 is backwardsclosed with respect to lcl !, so S 1 contains the node from which g originates, so g is not replaceable in S 1 .
case: g appears in some negative regular node n in S 1 . n 0 is a positive node, so n 6 = n 0 .
Before n 0 , the penetrator does not know g, so the occurrence of g in termn must be encrypted with a key k not known to the penetrator. We p r o ve b y c o n tradiction that g is not replaceable in S 1 . Suppose g is replaceable in S 1 . S 1 irreplaceably supports itself, so item 3 in the de nition of irreplaceable support implies that the penetrator is able to construct termn , where maps g to some fresh genval. But the penetrator does not know k and hence is unable to do this, a contradiction. Proof: The forward direction of the i " is easy. For the reverse direction , we prove the contrapositive, i.e., we suppose there exists a history tr of violating , and we construct a history of with strand count at most f that violates . Agreement is a safety property AS85 satis ed by histories with zero nodes, and tr is wellfounded, so there exists a minimal with respect to tr n o d e n 0 such that 1. preds tr n 0 regarded as a history satis es .
2. preds tr n 0 f n 0 g violates . Let s 0 = strandn 0 .
By hypothesis, all histories of with strand count f; satisfy SCRf, so Theorem 1 implies that satis es SCRf, so there exists an irreplaceable support S 0 for s 0 in tr with strand count at most f. Lemma 2 implies that S 0 can be transformed into a history tr 0 by replacing replaceable genvals with fresh genvals and adding penetrator strands. It remains to show t h a t tr 0 violates .
is an agreement requirement, so it has the form: hr 1 ; len 1 ; params 1 i precedes hr 2 ; len 2 ; params 2 i. n 0 causes a violation of , s o s 0 is a strand for r 2 , and indexn 0 = len 2 . n 0 is in N tr 0 , so removing nodes in N tr n N tr 0 does not destroy this violation of . The rst and second well-formedness requirements for protocols imply that replacing replaceable genvals in regular nodes is equivalent t o changing some arguments of some strands; speci cally, for each regular strand s with an argument equal to a replaceable genval g, that argument i s c hanged to g. In general, changing arguments of strands could destroy the violation of by causing the arguments corresponding to parameters params 1 of some strand s 1 for r 1 to becomeequal to the arguments corresponding to parameters params 2 of r 2 . The substitutions described in the statement of Lemma 2 replace distinct genvals with distinct genvals and therefore do not introduce new equalities between arguments of strands. Thus, tr 0 violates .
